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Abstract: Relationships between the Federal funds rate, unemployment, inflation,
and the long-term government-bond rate are investigated with cointegration tech-
niques. We find a stable long-term relationship between the Federal funds rate, un-
employment, and the bond rate. This relationship is interpretable as a policy target
because deviations are corrected primarily via the Federal funds rate. A traditional
Taylor-type rule is clearly rejected by the data. Inflation does thus only influence the
instrument indirectly via the bond rate, but we find that inflation is controllable with
the Federal funds rate. The results are in accordance with recent developments in
monetary theory stressing management of expectations as an important transmission
channel.
Keywords: Cointegration; Equilibrium Correction; Monetary Policy; Taylor rule;
Bond rate.
JEL Classification: C32; E52.
1 Introduction
In his seminal contribution, Taylor (1993) suggests that the complex monetary policy
process in the US 1987 − 1992 can be summarized by a simple policy rule, in which the
Federal funds rate reflects deviations of inflation and activity from their policy targets.
Over the past decade, several authors have elaborated on the so-called Taylor-rules by
introducing interest-rate smoothing; discussing the the role of expectations, forecasts, and
data revisions; and analyzing the robustness of the policy rules to diﬀerent measures of
The authors would like to thank Christopher Bowdler, Eilev Jansen, Henrik Jensen, Søren Johansen,
Katarina Juselius, Dan Knudsen, and Hans Christian Kongsted for comments. Remaining errors and
shortcomings are the sole responsibilities of the authors. The empirical analysis was carried out using Ox,
see Doornik (2002), and PcGive, see Doornik and Hendry (2001).
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activity and inflation, see inter alia Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Evans (1998), Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (1998), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Carey (2001), Orphanides
(2001), Ball and Tchaidze (2002), and Orphanides and Williams (2003).
In this paper we scrutinize the empirical regularities between activity (as measured
by the monthly unemployment rate), inflation, a 10-year government bond rate, and the
Federal funds rate for the period since Greenspan became chairman for the Federal reserve
board: 1988 : 1− 2004 : 8. Our main goal is to analyze the existence of a monetary policy
rule in terms of observable variables, and using a cointegrated vector autoregressive (VAR)
system we distinguish between longer-term targets and shorter-term dynamic adjustment.
In this line of thoughts, the actual reaction function represents the dynamic adjustment
towards equilibrium making interest rate smoothing an integral part of the model, and we
argue that a long-term relationship can only be interpreted as a policy rule if deviations
from the implied target explain changes in the Federal funds rate. In this way we do
not merely estimate the coeﬃcients of a postulated policy rule, we also test implications
of the identification scheme. In the applied system approach the dynamic adjustment
of all variables can be characterized simultaneously, and if a stable monetary policy rule
is found, we can analyze the eﬀectiveness of the instrument in the control of the policy
objectives.
As a second contribution we use the cointegrated VAR model directly to approximate
the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment. The natural rate is approximated
by a high degree polynomial in time and the shape of the polynomial is determined
simultaneously with the VAR coeﬃcients, exploiting all the information in the sample.
This is contrary to most other research, where the natural rate is determined outside the
model using a polynomial or a linear filter, while the econometric models are estimated
conditional on the natural rate.
A third contribution of the paper is the introduction of the bond rate, which allows
us to characterize the interaction between monetary policy and market interest rates.
Several authors have advocated for the important role of the bond rate for monetary
policy, see inter alia Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Goodfriend (1991), and Goodfriend
(1998). In addition, there has been an increasing interest in the information content of
the yield-curve for future inflation, future activity, or future short and long rates, cf.
Mishkin (1990), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Hardouvelis (1994), and the survey by
Estrella and Mishkin (1996). According to visual inspection the bond rate seems to be
of importance in empirical research of US monetary policy, cf. Christensen (2002), and
from a theoretical perspective there has been a growing interest in models including the
long rates, cf. Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2004), Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2004), and
Piazzesi (2005) to mention a few important contributions. According to our empirical
results the inclusion of the bond rate is crucial. In particular, we find a stable long-
term relationship between the Federal funds rate, unemployment, and the bond rate; and
a significantly equilibrium correction of the Federal funds rate allows for a policy-rule
interpretation. By excluding the bond rate we find a new long-term relationship with the
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inflation rate included, but the results are unstable and the Federal funds rate does not
adjust to narrow the gap between the actual and the equilibrium rate; a traditional Taylor
rule is thus clearly rejected by the data. We interpret this rejection as an indication that
the bond rate contains relevant information on the inflation process besides information
on financial market conditions in general.
We are of course fully aware that the monetary policy process in real-time is far more
complicated than a simple policy rule suggests. Nevertheless, the present study gives
a parsimonious but still empirically relevant representation of the kind of factors that
have entered the decision making process. Woodford (2003) makes a distinction between
central banking as setting a short-term interest rate and central banking as management of
expectations, and Kohn and Sack (2003) find that statements by the Federal Open Market
Committee, FOMC, and testimonies in Congress by Chairman Greenspan significantly
aﬀect market interest rates at longer maturities. A straightforward way to think of this
result is that the monetary policy objectives as well as FOMC’s assessment of the actual
cyclical developments are clarified via testimonies and statements. Accordingly market
interest rates can move in advance of the Federal funds rate in case the perceptions of
market participants change, and our findings regarding the role of the bond rate can easily
be interpreted as the outcome of such a process with forward-looking expectations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, Sections 2 presents a simple
theoretical framework for the analysis. Section 3 and 4 then presents, respectively, the
data measurements and the econometric approach, while Section 5 reports the empirical
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Framework for Taylor Rules
In an important paper, Taylor (1993) suggested that the FOMC has managed the Federal
funds rate according to the simple linear formula
ft = πt + λ1 · (ut − u∗t ) + λ2 · (πt − π∗t ) + κ0,
where ft denotes the Federal funds rate, πt and π∗t denote the inflation and the monetary
policy target, ut and u∗t denote the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unem-
ployment, and the constant term, κ0, is interpretable as the target real interest rate in
equilibrium. If the inflation target is assumed constant, as it is usually the case, π∗ is not
empirically identifiable and the relation collapses to
ft = λ1 · (ut − u∗t ) + (1 + λ2) · πt + κ1, (1)
where κ1 = κ0 − λ2π∗.
In the basic formulation, the relation (1) is contemporaneous, and some empirical
applications use (1) as a basis for a linear regression, see e.g. Evans (1998) and Ball and
Tchaidze (2002). Alternatively a partial adjustment structure can be considered, e.g.
ft = ρ · ft−1 + (1− ρ) · [λ1 · (ut − u∗t ) + (1 + λ2) · πt + κ1] , (2)
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where ρ > 0 implies interest rate smoothing, see Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Orphanides
(2001), and English, Nelson, and Sack (2003).
Empirically, time series for inflation and interest rates are highly persistent, and they
are often well approximated as unit root processes. This complicates inference on the
parameters in (1) due to the spurious regression problem, and a natural starting point
for an empirical analysis is therefore formal tests for integration and cointegration. If
the variables in (1) are diﬀerence stationary, or I(1), a convenient representation of the
dynamics is the (conditional) equilibrium correction form
∆ft = γ1 ·∆(ut − u∗t ) + γ2 ·∆πt + α ·
£
ft−1 − λ1 · (ut−1 − u∗t−1)− (1 + λ2) · πt−1 − κ1
¤
.
This is a natural generalization of the model in (2) and it formally redefines the Taylor
rule from a contemporaneous reaction function to a longer-term target value for the policy
rate, f∗t = λ1 · (ut−1 − u∗t−1) + (1 + λ2) · πt−1 + κ1. For f∗t to be interpretable as a target
value for monetary policy it must hold that the Federal funds rate, ft, corrects deviations
from the target, ft−f∗t , which implies that α should be significantly negative. Within the
vector autoregressive framework that we adopt in the empirical analysis in Section 5 we
can formally test hypotheses on the equilibrium correction structure, and therefore also
test whether f∗t can be interpreted as a policy target.
2.1 The Role of Expectations
Several authors have stressed the forward looking nature of monetary policy and empha-
sized the role of expectations, see Svensson (2003) for a review. Due to the considerable
time lag in monetary policy it makes sense for the monetary authority to be preemptive
and act on expected future conditions. Forward looking Taylor rules have been estimated
in inter alia Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Or-
phanides (2001), and Orphanides and Williams (2003). They usually have the form
ft = λ
∗
1 ·E
£
(ut+h − u∗t+h) | It
¤
+ (1 + λ∗2) ·E [πt+h | It] + κ∗1, (3)
where E [· | It] denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time t, and h
denotes the forecast horizon. Estimation is typically based on rational-expectations-type
moment conditions involving instruments in the information set, It.
In a linear (or linearized) model of the economy, the rational expectations are them-
selves linear functions of realized values of the variables in the information set, i.e.
E
£
ut+h − u∗t+h | It
¤
= δu,u · (ut − u∗t ) + δu,π · πt
E [πt+h | It] = δπ,u · (ut − u∗t ) + δπ,π · πt,
possibly including more dynamics, see Orphanides andWilliams (2003) and Ireland (2003).
Substituting the forecast functions into (3) yields a representation which is observational
equivalent to (1), with λ1 = λ∗1 · δu,u + (1 + λ∗2) · δπ,u and (1 + λ2) = λ∗1 · δu,π + (1 + λ∗2) ·
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δπ,π. Orphanides and Williams (2003) denote the resulting Taylor rule outcome-based,
and it is interpretable as a reduced form representation of the entire policy process in
terms of observables. This is suﬃcient for measuring the stance of monetary policy,
describing developments in the monetary policy process, and predicting future interest
rate movements. In practice, of course, expectations need not to be rational, and the
reduced form is compatible with other configurations of expectation formations.
Besides this general treatment of expectations, we want specifically to analyze the role
of financial market information. As noted by Goodfriend (1991) and Goodfriend (1998)
the long-term bond yield automatically moves with inflation expectations of the agents
in financial markets. This information could be useful for the monetary authority. Either
directly as an explanatory variable in a structural Taylor-rule, or as an instrument in
the forecasting equation, implying a bond-yield in the outcome-based rule for the entire
policy process. The bond rate could also contain other relevant information; a sudden
increase in the bond rate could reflect a declining credibility of monetary policy and the
FOMC could react by a preemptive increase in the Federal funds rate. In theory the
relationship between the short- and the long rate is normally turned the other way round,
making long-term rates a function of expected future short-term rates as in the expectation
theory of the term structure, even if Schiller (1990) acknowledges that a lot of evidence
speaks against the empirical validity of the theory. Note, however, that a causation in
both directions is not a problem for the current empirical analysis, as the statistical model
allows all variables to be endogenous from the outset.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) also use the spread between the Federal fund rate, ft, and
a long term bond rate, bt, as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy and estimates
reaction function for ft − bt as well as for ft. Mehra (2001) and Carey (2001) include the
bond rate as an additional variable in a Taylor rule. The use of the term structure of
interest rates also fits with recent research on the spread between the Federal funds rate
and a bond yield as a predictor of future inflation or activity, cf. Mishkin (1990), Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991), and Estrella and Mishkin (1996).
Since bt will react with a one-to-one impact from inflation expectations, and inflation
is already present in the target (1), we insert only the ’new’ information as measured by
the real bond rate, bt−πt, and correct for the average ’tilt’ of the yield curve, τ , to obtain
ft = λ1 · (ut − u∗t ) + (1 + λ2 − λ3) · πt + λ3 · bt + κ2,
where κ2 = κ0 − λ2π∗ − λ3τ . If there is a one-to-one impact from the bond rate to the
Federal funds rate, λ3 = 1, we obtain a simple Taylor-type target for the interest rate
spread:
ft = bt + λ1 · (ut − u∗t ) + λ2 · πt + κ2. (4)
In the empirical analysis, we consider relations of the form (1) and (4) as candidates for
the longer-term policy target in terms of observables.
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3 Data Measurements
To analyze the empirical evidence on interest rate setting and the role of monetary policy,
we consider a data vector, Yt = (ft : bt : ut : πt)
0, comprising the eﬀective Federal funds
rate, ft; a 10 year constant maturity Treasury bond rate, bt; the unemployment rate, ut,
calculated as the number of unemployed as a percentage of the civilian labour force (both
seasonally adjusted); and core inflation measured as 100 times the year-on-year change in
the log transformed consumer price index excluding food and energy, πt. The considered
eﬀective estimation sample is 1988 : 1−2002 : 12, and we condition the analysis on the last
months of 1987. Observations for 2003 : 1− 2004 : 8 are used for out-of-sample analysis.
The time series are presented in Figure 1. Graph (A) depicts the Federal funds rate
and the Treasury bond rate while graph (B) depicts the spread, ft− bt. The interest rates
have some similarities, but the fluctuations in the Federal funds rate, ft, are larger than
those in the bond rate, bt, and on average ft has been lower than bt.
Graph (C) depicts the unemployment rate. The sample period covers a slack in the
early 1990s and a subsequent long upturn ending sharply in 2000, where the unemployment
rate is down to 4%. A comparison of (C) and (A) indicates a negative correlation between
ut and ft, and there is also a clear correlation between ut and the interest rate spread,
ft − bt, in (B). Some authors have suggested that a considerable proportion of the fall
in the unemployment rate over the period can be attributed to a fall in the natural
rate of unemployment, u∗t , see inter alia Ball and Tchaidze (2002). The natural rate
is unobservable, but the considered system of variables may contain information on the
changes in u∗t . To extract this information we assume that changes in the natural rate
are smooth and we use a fifth-order polynomial in the time index t to approximate the
natural rate, i.e. u∗t = g(t), where g(t) is a polynomial. In doing so, we reformulate the
system in terms of the unemployment gap, ut − u∗t .
Finally graph (D) depicts core inflation. Inflation has been steadily decreasing over
the period with bouts of rising inflation in early 1990s and early 2000s. The downward
trend in πt is also reflected in decreasing nominal interest rates, whereas high frequency
movements seem less related.
4 Econometric Approach
As a statistical framework for the analysis we use the cointegrated vector autoregressive
(VAR) model of Johansen (1988), Johansen (1991) and Johansen (1996). It is important
to note that by adopting this framework we do not assume unit roots in the variables. On
the contrary, the starting point is a stationary VAR model and unit roots impose testable
restrictions on the dynamic system.
The starting point is the p−dimensional VAR model in equilibrium correction form:
H(r) : ∆Zt = α
¡
β0Zt−1 + µ0
¢
+
k−1X
i=1
Γi∆Zt−i + t, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (5)
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Figure 1: The data 1987 : 1 − 2004 : 8. The vertical lines indicate the end of the
estimation sample 2002 : 12.
Here α and β are p×r matrices where β0Zt represents the r ≤ p cointegrating relationships
and α gives the direction and speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. The remaining
autoregressive coeﬃcients, Γ1, ...,Γk−1, are of dimension p× p, and µ is an r× 1 constant
term. Throughout, we assume that t is an i.i.d. Gaussian sequence, N (0,Ω), and we
condition on the initial values, Z−k+1, ..., Z0, see Johansen (1996, chapter 6).
Under the assumption that the characteristic polynomial, A (z) = (1− z) I − αβ0z −Pk−1
i=1 Γi (1− z) zi, has p−r unit roots and the remaining roots are all located outside the
unit circle, the variables, Zt, have the representation
Zt = C
tX
i=1
i +C (L) t + τ0, (6)
where C = β⊥ (α
0
⊥(I − Γ1 − ...− Γk−1)β⊥)
−1 α0⊥ is a p × p dimensional long-run impact
matrix of rank p−r, C (L) is a convergent polynomial, and τ0 depends on µ and the initial
values, see Johansen (1996, Theorem 4.2). It follows from (6) that the non-stationarity of
Zt is driven by p − r common stochastic trends defined as α0⊥
Xt
i=1
i, with loadings in
the individual variables given by the first part of the matrix C. The interpretation of a
coeﬃcient Cij in C is the long-run eﬀect on variable i from an innovation to j .
Johansen and Juselius (2001) use this insight to discuss the issue of controllability of
a target variables with a given instrument in the cointegrated VAR model. A target,
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d0Zt, is said to be controllable with an instrument a0Zt, where a and d are p−dimensional
vectors, if d0Yt can be made stationary around a target value d∗ by intervening in a0Zt at
all points in time. The necessary condition for controllability is therefore that a shock to
the instrument has a non-zero long-run impact on the target, i.e. that d0Ca 6= 0. As an
example, let Zt = (ft : bt : ut : πt)
0 as in our empirical analysis in Section 5. A necessary
condition for controllability of the inflation rate, πt, with the Federal funds rate, ft, is
that C41 6= 0. This is a testable hypothesis in the cointegrated VAR model.
4.1 Deterministic Specification
In the specification in (5) the constant term is restricted to be proportional to α, which
produces non-zero means in the long-run relationships but no deterministic linear trends
in the variables. This is our preferred specification as it may be hard from economic
theory to rationalize an autonomous drift in interest rates and inflation. Most of the
time series in Figure 1 show a trending behavior in the sample period, however, and from
an empirical point of view deterministic linear trends may be a reasonable alternative
to stochastic trends. In the present paper we therefore take a pragmatic approach and
conduct a sensitivity analysis where we also present results allowing for linear trends in
all variables.
To estimate the natural rate of unemployment, u∗t = g(t), where g(t) is a polynomial
in the time index t, we formulate a cointegrated VAR model with additive corrections, see
Nielsen (2004b). In particular, we let Zt in (5) be a vector of unobserved variables, which
is related to the observations Yt by the additive equation
Zt = Yt − θDt, (7)
where Dt is a n× 1 vector of deterministic variables and θ is a matrix of coeﬃcients. In
the present case Dt = (t : t2 : ... : t5)0 so that θDt is a fifth-order polynomial. To avoid
polynomial terms in ft, bt, and πt, we impose restrictions on θ of the form
Zt =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ft
bt
ut − u∗t
πt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= Yt − θDt =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ft
bt
ut
πt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
θ11 0 0 0 0
θ21 0 0 0 0
θ31 θ32 θ33 θ34 θ35
θ41 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
t
t2
t3
t4
t5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (8)
Our preferred specification excludes linear trends in ft, bt, and πt by setting θ11 = θ21 =
θ41 = 0. The alternative specification with deterministic linear trends in all variables
leaves θ11, θ21, and θ41 unrestricted.
To estimate the cointegrated VAR system in (5) with the additive corrections in (7),
we apply the switching algorithm proposed in Nielsen (2004a). First, conditional on
an estimate eθ of θ, the parameters in (5) can be estimated in a standard cointegration
analysis for the corrected variables, Zt = Yt − eθDt. In the next iteration we can find
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an updated estimate bθ of θ conditional on the estimated VAR parameters. In particular,
the estimated residuals are given by, bet = bA (L)Yt − bαbµ0, where bA (L) is the estimated
characteristic polynomial. Under the model specified in (5) and (7), the residuals can be
written as bet = bA (L) θDt + t = bHtvec (θ) + t,
where vec(θ) stacks the columns of θ, and bHt = D0t ⊗ bA (L) = ( bA (L)D1t : bA (L)D2t : ... :bA (L)Dnt). In this model θ can be found as the GLS type estimator
vec
³bθ´ = Ã TX
i=1
³ bH 0tbΩ−1 bHt´
!−1Ã TX
i=1
³ bH 0tbΩ−1bet´
!
, (9)
see also Tsay, Peña, and Pankratz (2000). Full-information maximum likelihood estimates
can be obtained by iterating between the two steps until convergence, and the restrictions
in (8) can easily be imposed in the GLS step (9).
5 Empirical Analysis of US Monetary Policy
In this section we look at the empirical evidence on the interdependencies between interest
rates, inflation and unemployment and their implications for monetary policy.
As a starting point we consider the unrestricted model H(4) under the additive speci-
fication in (8) as a representation of the autocovariance structure in the data. Information
criteria and successive testing for removal of lags indicate that a lag length of k = 3 is
suﬃcient to capture the dependence in the time series, and we choose this model in the
following.
Table 1 reports a battery of misspecification tests. Overall the model is well behaved.
The only deviation from the null hypotheses of a well specified model is the rejection of
Gaussian residuals in the equation for inflation, due to two outliers in the year 1990. One
purpose of this paper is to analyze the policy-response to inflation shocks, and therefore
we prefer not to remove the shocks by including dummy variables. We can add that other
choices of lag-length as well as the presence of the two dummies only marginally change
the results presented below.
5.1 Rank Determination
Based on the statistical model we turn to the number of unit roots. The cointegration
models form a nested sequence, H(0) ⊂ ... ⊂ H(r) ⊂ ... ⊂ H(p). The number of unit
roots, p − r, and the number of long-run relations, r, can be determined by likelihood
ratio (LR) tests in the sequence. Here we consider the hypotheses H(r) | H(p), parallel
to the well-known trace tests.
The results of the LR tests are reported in Table 2 for the two deterministic specifica-
tions. The model H(0) with four unit roots and no cointegration is clearly rejected. The
model H(1) with r = 1 long-run relationship and three unit roots has p−values of 11%
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AR(1) AR(1-7) ARCH(1-4) Normality
∆ft 3.076 [0.08] 6.335 [0.50] 5.823 [0.21] 3.340 [0.19]
∆rt 2.422 [0.12] 12.023 [0.10] 4.525 [0.34] 4.726 [0.09]
∆ut 0.508 [0.48] 5.986 [0.54] 0.753 [0.94] 0.553 [0.76]
∆πt 0.052 [0.82] 5.227 [0.63] 1.498 [0.83] 10.914 [0.00]
Multivariate tests 2.104 [0.99] 119.133 [0.30] 414.690 [0.30] 20.811 [0.01]
Table 1: Tests for misspecification of the unrestricted VAR(3). Figures in square brackets
are p−values. AR(1) are LM tests for first order autocorrelation in the residuals and are
distributed as χ2(1) and χ2(16) for the single equation and multivariate tests respectively.
AR(1-7) are LM tests for autocorrelation up to seventh order and are distributed as χ2(7)
and χ2(112) respectively. ARCH (1-4) are LM tests for ARCH eﬀects up to fourth order
and are distributed as χ2(4) and χ2(400) respectively. The last column reports the Doornik
and Hansen (1994) tests for normality, distributed as χ2(2) and χ2(8) respectively.
(A) Fifth order polynomial in ut
H(0) H(1) H(2) H(3) H(4)
Log-likelihood 1389.82 1407.38 1420.14 1425.58 1427.74
LR: H(r) | H(4) 75.83 [0.00] 40.71 [0.11] 15.21 [0.21] 4.32 [0.37] ...
(B) Fifth order polynomial in ut and linear trends in (ft : bt : πt)
H(0) H(1) H(2) H(3) H(4)
Log-likelihood 1391.42 1408.88 1421.49 1432.19 1438.06
LR: H(r) | H(4) 93.27 [0.00] 58.35 [0.07] 33.14 [0.17] 11.73 [0.41] ...
Table 2: Likelihood ratio tests for rank determination, H(r)|H(p). Asymptotic p-values
in square brackets. The asymptotic distributions have been simulated for the current de-
terministic specifications.
and 7% for the two diﬀerent deterministic specifications, indicating the presence of one
stationary relation. In the models with r = 1, the largest unrestricted eigenvalues in the
companion matrix have moduli given by 0.89 in both the two deterministic specifications,
indicating that the adjustment towards equilibrium is relatively slow. In the larger model
H(2) the largest unrestricted eigenvalues have moduli of 0.95 and 0.92 in the two cases,
which again seem to reflect the non-stationarity of the second relation. In the main set of
results presented below we therefore take the model H(1) as the preferred, but in Section
5.6 we discuss the possible interpretation of a second long-run relationship in the system.
In the preferred model H(1) the linear trends are largely insignificant in the interest
rates and inflation and a LR test for the hypothesis θ11 = θ21 = θ41 = 0 give a statistic of
−2 · (1407.38− 1408.88) = 3.0, which is not significant in a χ2(3).
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5.2 Long-Run Structure
Taking the model H(1) with r = 1 long-run relation as the preferred, the unrestricted
estimates of α and β∗ are reported in Table 3 under H0. Panel (A) again reports the
results for the preferred specification, while panel (B) reports the results for the alternative
specification with linear trends in ft, bt, and πt. The long-run relation is normalized on
the Federal funds rate, and the coeﬃcient to the Treasury bond rate is around minus
unity and statistically significant. The coeﬃcient to the unemployment gap, ut − u∗t , is
just below three, indicating that labour market pressure is associated with a high Federal
funds rate. The coeﬃcient to core inflation is positive as well, the opposite of the expected
for a monetary policy rule.
For the long-run relation to be interpretable as a monetary policy rule, a necessary
condition is that the adjustment coeﬃcient in the Federal funds equation, α1, is signif-
icantly negative, such that deviations from equilibrium are corrected by policy actions.
According to the t−ratios for α this is indeed the case with t−ratios of −3.65 and −4.36
for the two deterministic specifications, respectively. There is also a significantly negative
impact in the inflation equation, indicating that a high interest rate relative to the target
lowers inflation. The adjustment in the equation for the bond rate is close to zero and the
adjustment in the unemployment equation is also insignificant.
Based on the unrestricted coeﬃcients, the long-run relation looks like a monetary pol-
icy target. A conventional Taylor rule would imply a zero coeﬃcient for the Treasury
bond rate, β2 = 0. Imposing this restriction gives the results reported under H1. Under
this hypothesis the presence of linear trends in the variables is important, and the results
diﬀer markedly between the two specifications. In panel (A), without linear trends in
the variables, the coeﬃcient to the inflation rate is significantly positive, giving no sup-
port for a traditional Taylor-rule as a long-run target for monetary policy. This is also
emphasized by the fact that under the restriction in H1 the Federal funds rate do not
adjust to deviations from the target. In panel (B), allowing for deterministic linear trends
in the variables, the coeﬃcient to inflation is significantly negative, indicating a possible
Taylor rule. Interestingly, however, the Federal funds rate, ft, adjusts away from equilib-
rium, invalidating the interpretation of the relation as a target for the policy instrument.
Moreover, in both cases the LR test for the restriction is around the 5% critical value.
The above results suggest an important role for the bond rate in monetary policy.
And since the inflation term has the wrong sign in the unrestricted relation under H0, it
is natural to impose a zero restriction on β4. Imposing this restriction yields the results
reported underH2. In both deterministic specifications, the restriction is clearly accepted.
Without the inflation term, the long-run relation is close to being formulated in the interest
rate spread; which also implies a simple interpretation of the theoretical relation in (4).
Under H3 we have reported the results after imposing the additional restriction, β2 =
−1. The restriction produces LR statistics corresponding to p−values of 0.55 and 0.37,
for the two deterministic specifications. In this model the coeﬃcient to the unemployment
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(A) Fifth order polynomial in ut
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4
α β∗ α β∗ α β∗ α β∗ α β∗
ft −0.049
(−3.65)
1 −0.007
(−0.76)
1 −0.039
(−2.46)
1 −0.039
(−2.45)
1 −0.078
(−4.48)
1
bt −0.014
(−0.68)
−1.287
(−4.93)
−0.033
(−2.51)
0 −0.017
(−0.72)
−1.010
(−11.67)
−0.018
(−0.75)
−1 0 −1
ut − u∗t −0.007
(−0.66)
2.945
(10.46)
0.000
(0.01)
4.752
(11.83)
−0.032
(−2.49)
3.006
(13.98)
−0.032
(−2.48)
3.008
(14.24)
0 2.454
(13.98)
πt −0.054
(−4.86)
1.152
(3.55)
−0.039
(−5.36)
1.239
(4.33)
−0.060
(−4.63)
0 −0.061
(−4.63)
0 −0.057
(−3.64)
0
1 −18.628
(−7.60)
−39.786
(−12.08)
−16.025
(−10.90)
−16.107
(−13.03)
−13.378
(−12.62)
Loglik 1407.384 1405.211 1406.780 1406.780 1404.083
LR statistic ... 4.346 1.208 1.208 6.602
p−value ... [0.04] [0.27] [0.55] [0.16]
... χ2 (1) χ2 (1) χ2 (2) χ2 (4)
(B) Fifth order polynomial in ut and linear trends in (ft : bt : πt)
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4
α β∗ α β∗ α β∗ α β∗ α β∗
ft −0.054
(−4.36)
1 0.020
(2.79)
1 −0.044
(−2.81)
1 −0.046
(−2.76)
1 −0.083
(−4.77)
1
bt −0.010
(−0.53)
−1.380
(−4.60)
0.002
(0.14)
0 −0.005
(−0.23)
−1.119
(−5.15)
−0.013
(−0.53)
−1 0 −1
ut − u∗t 0.000
(0.01)
2.746
(9.72)
0.036
(−6.34)
2.783
(14.97)
−0.032
(−2.54)
2.888
(12.42)
−0.033
(−2.46)
2.904
(15.70)
0 2.373
(18.07)
πt −0.046
(−4.38)
1.576
(4.02)
0.004
(0.63)
−4.818
(−8.04
−0.055
(−4.26)
0 −0.060
(−4.37)
0 −0.052
(−3.30)
0
1 −19.439
(−5.36)
2.682
(1.01)
−15.125
(−5.19)
−16.083
(−15.57)
−13.347
(−19.09)
Loglik 1408.882 1407.118 1407.911 1407.888 1405.525
LR statistic ... 3.528 1.942 1.988 6.714
p−value ... [0.06] [0.16] [0.37] [0.15]
... χ2 (1) χ2 (1) χ2 (2) χ2 (4)
Table 3: Testing hypotheses on the long-run structure. t−values based on asymptotic
standard errors in parentheses. β∗ = (β0 : β00)0 denotes the augmented cointegration
vector.
gap is around three, and the Federal funds rate and inflation adjust to deviations from
the long-run relation. The bond rate seems exogenous; and the adjustment coeﬃcient to
the unemployment gap has an unexpected negative sign, indicating that a high interest
rate decrease unemployment.
Imposing the additional restrictions that bt and ut − u∗t are weakly exogenous for the
long-run coeﬃcients, α2 = α3 = 0, produces the preferred results reported under H4. The
preferred structure is accepted as a reduction of the unrestricted model with insignificant
χ2 (4) LR statistics of 6.60 and 6.71.
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5.3 Characterizing US Monetary Policy 1988 : 1− 2004 : 8
In this section, implications of our empirical findings for US monetary policy 1988 : 1 −
2002 : 12 are presented, and the more recent observations, 2003 : 1 − 2004 : 8, are used
for post-sample analysis.
Under the preferred restrictions in H4, the results are almost identical for the two
deterministic specifications. For the preferred specification without linear trends, the
long-run relation can be written as
ft − bt = −2.454 · (ut − u∗t ) + 13.377, (10)
which is a Taylor-type target for the interest rate spread with a significant impact from
the unemployment gap and a zero impact from inflation beyond that contained in the
expected inflation via bt. Deviations from this relation are corrected primarily by the
Federal funds rate, ft, eliminating 8% of a misalignment each month. This may seem like
a slow adjustment, but recall that the target is estimated within a dynamic framework
where ft also adjust to news in terms of the first diﬀerences. There is also a negative
coeﬃcient in the equation for ∆πt, indicating that a high funds rate suppress inflation.
The Federal funds rate and the estimated long-run target are depicted in Graph (A)
of Figure 2, where the relationship is extended out of sample to 2004 : 8. The graph
clearly demonstrates that the long-run target has been leading the Federal funds rate
when major changes in the latter has occurred corresponding to visual evidence of the
endogeneity of the Federal funds rate in the system. It is also clear that the static target
is relatively volatile which explains the need for interest rate smoothing. In particular,
ft does not jump instantaneously to the estimated target value, but deviations from the
relation set out in (10) is a good indicator of the direction of movements in the funds rate.
The deviations show that the interest rate in the initial period and during 1988 was lower
than suggested by the relationship. A common interpretation relates this to concerns for
the financial stability after the crash in the stock market in late 1987. The same type of
concern might explain the relatively low interest rates in 1999 after the financial crisis in
Russia and the problems related to LTCM. Such eﬀects are clearly outside the information
set of the current simple model.
The estimated natural rate of unemployment, u∗t , interpretable as the rate of unem-
ployment that leaves monetary policy unaﬀected, is reported in graph (B). We note that
the level of u∗t is not identified in the model, and the graph is constructed by assuming
that the natural rate has the same sample average as ut. The main picture is that u∗t has
been by and large constant until 1994; whereas a considerable proportion of the unem-
ployment fall during 1994−2000 is attributed to a fall in u∗t . We note, that the estimated
polynomial u∗t = g(t), which approximates the natural rate in the estimation is not useful
for predictions, and for the out-of-sample analysis, we take a simple approach and assume
that u∗t is constant.
As mentioned above, actual inflation is not directly present in the empirical rule under
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H4. An interpretation of this is, that the period under consideration has been characterized
by only moderate inflationary pressure and therefore limited information on the impact
of actual inflation in the policy rule. Although actual inflation does not enter expected
inflation is present with a coeﬃcient of 1 via the long-term interest rate. It is probably a
specific feature for US monetary policy that the long-run policy rule can be reduced to a
relationship between the interest rate spread and unemployment. The results reported in
Christensen (2002) do not suggest that similar policy rules have been in place in UK or
Sweden, nor at the ECB.
The fact that the bond rate and unemployment gap are weakly exogenous implies
that α⊥ will contain unit vectors corresponding to these variables. The interpretation is
that the cumulated shocks to these equations constitute driving stochastic trends in the
system. The estimate of α⊥ is given by
bα⊥ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1.367
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
indicating that the last driving trend is the cumulated shocks in the equation for ft −
1.367πt, which is close to the shocks to the real funds rate. The restriction that the last
driving trend is the shock to ft − πt corresponds to the restriction that the adjustment
coeﬃcient is identical in the equations for ∆ft and ∆πt. This restriction can be accepted
with a marginal LR statistic of 0.43 and a p−value of 0.51 in a χ2(1) distribution. The
non-stationarity thus seems to be driven by business-cycle shocks to the unemployment
gap, ut− u∗t , shocks to the financial markets as measured by bt, and real monetary policy
shocks to ft − πt.
Based on the moving average representation in (6) we can also test if objectives of mon-
etary policy are actually controllable by the Federal funds rate in the estimated system.
The long-run impact matrix is given by
bC =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.240
(0.25)
2.226
(2.87)
−3.284
(−2.53)
−0.328
(−0.74)
−0.070
(−0.17)
1.303
(3.86)
−0.154
(−0.27)
0.096
(0.49)
−0.126
(−0.47)
−0.376
(−1.70)
1.275
(3.45)
0.173
(1.36)
−0.494
(−2.14)
0.487
(2.57)
−0.727
(−2.30)
0.675
(6.20)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
with asymptotic t−ratios in parentheses. Recall that the necessary condition for control-
lability of inflation is that C41 6= 0. The relevant coeﬃcient is −0.494, indicating that a
one percentage point innovation to the Federal funds rate, interpretable as an unexpected
policy change, lowers the long-run core inflation rate with 0.5 percentage points. Accord-
ing to the t−ratio the coeﬃcient is significant, suggesting that the FOMC can actually
control inflation in the present context. For the unemployment gap, the situation is the
opposite, with a t−ratio of −0.47.
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Figure 2: Graph (A) depicts the long-run Taylor-type target and the actual Federal
funds rate. Graph (B) depicts the unemployment rate and the estimated natural rate
of unemployment, u∗t . In both cases a vertical line indicates the end of the estimation
sample, 2002 : 12. Graph (C) and (D) report results from recursive estimation done
for sub-samples t = 1988 : 1, ..., T0, where the endpoint takes the values T0 = 1992 :
1, ..., 2002 : 12. In each sub-sample the short-run parameters are fixed at their full-sample
estimates, see Hansen and Johansen (1999). By and large similar results are obtained
if the short-run parameters are reestimated in each sub-sample, although a larger initial
sample is necessary. (C) depicts the recursively estimated coeﬃcient to unemployment in
the long-run relation under H4 together with the 95% confidence band, while (D) depicts
the test statistics for the 4 over-identifying restrictions in H4 and the 5% critical value
for individual tests, see Kongsted (1998). Graph (E) depicts the actual and fitted values
of the Federal funds rate in the dynamic system. Finally, graph (F) depicts the one-step
forecasts and the actual Federal funds rate.
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5.4 Stability of the Results
An important issue is the structural stability of the estimates. According to the Lucas-
critique view on empirical analyses, only deep parameters, such as characterizations of
preferences and technical relationships, can be expected to be stable, whereas reaction
functions and reduced forms are prone to instabilities following shocks to the system.
To evaluate the stability of the relation we depict in graph (C) the recursively estimated
parameters to unemployment in the long-run relation, see Hansen and Johansen (1999).
The estimates look remarkably stable, and the narrowing of the 95% confidence bands
indicates an increasing information on the parameters. Finally graph (D) depicts the
recursively calculated test statistic for the over-identifying restrictions. Apart from a few
observations in the beginning of the recursive estimations, where the number of degrees
of freedom is small, the identifying structure is clearly acceptable in all sub-samples.
5.5 Short-Run Structure
To illustrate the dynamic reaction function we apply a general-to-specific modelling strat-
egy and find a parsimonious representation of the system, see Hendry and Mizon (1993).
Using a conventional 5% critical level yields the following specification
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∆ft
∆bt
∆ (ut − u∗t )
∆πt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−0.080
(−4.88)
0.248
(3.76)
0.154
(3.12)
−0.200
(−2.27)
0.173
(2.83
0
0 0 0.319
(4.54)
0 0 0
0 −0.203
(−4.55)
0 −0.188
(−2.56)
0 0.163
(2.44)
−0.041
(−3.72)
0 0 0 0 −0.231
(−3.23)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ft−1 − f∗t−1
∆ft−1
∆bt−1
∆
¡
ut−1 − u∗t−1
¢
∆ft−2
∆πt−2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
which produces a LR test statistic of 21.60 compared to the model underH4, corresponding
to p−value of 0.54 in a χ2(23).
The equation for the Federal funds rate represents the dynamic policy reaction function
formulated in terms of observable quantities, and it indicates a simple behavior. Apart
from the clearly significant adjustment towards the long-run target, there are only four
significant coeﬃcients. Together with the equilibrium correction coeﬃcient, α1, the coeﬃ-
cients to the autoregressive terms, ∆ft−1 and ∆ft−2, describe the interest rate smoothing.
Besides this feature, there are additional short-run terms to the one period lagged bond
rate, ∆bt−1, and unemployment rate, ∆ut−1, both with short-run coeﬃcients well below
the long-run impacts. We can add that the cross-correlations of the system residuals are
low, and none of them corresponds to significant contemporaneous eﬀects. The latter
finding is most likely a consequence of the time lag in the information set available for
monetary policy.
To illustrate the overall fit of the model, graph (E) depicts the actual and fitted values
for the funds rate from the dynamic model. The excellent in-sample fit translates to a
reasonable out-of-sample behavior. Graph (F) reports the one-step forecasts. Based on
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the current information set, the model is not able to predict the last fall in the funds rate
in the estimation sample, 2002 : 11, but it is notable that the model is actually able to
indicate the direction of the two interest changes in the out-of-sample period, the fall in
2003 : 7 and the rise in 2004 : 7. Both the fitted values and the forecasts are a bit more
volatile than actual interest rates, but the main tendency is captured. We can add that
the forecast performance for the remaining variables are much weaker, which just reflects
that the current information set in best suited for a description of monetary policy.
5.6 Interpretation of a Second Long-Run Relation
In the rank determination in Table 2, the second long-run relation was formally rejected,
but close to the 95% quantile of the simulated distribution. In this section we briefly
account for a possible interpretation of the second long-run relation, and illustrate that
the main findings in the analysis of the case r = 1 carry over to the alternative case r = 2.
In the presentation below, we focus on the case without deterministic linear trends in ft,
bt, and πt.
Allowing for a second long-run relation and imposing restrictions on α and β
∗
yields
the structure
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∆ft
∆bt
∆(ut − u∗t )
∆πt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−0.085
(−4.95)
−0.069
(−4.29)
0
(...)
0
(...)
0
(...)
0
(...)
−0.039
(−2.63)
−0.064
(−4.55)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
ft−1 − bt−1 + 0.887
(2.71)
πt−1 + 2.475
(15.98)
(ut−1 − u∗t−1)−18.539
(−17.88)
⎞
⎟⎠+ ...,
which is not rejected with a test statistic of 11.72 in a χ2(7) distribution. Note that for
r = 2, the cointegration space separates into a stationary interest rate spread, ft−bt, and a
stationary relation between inflation, πt, and the unemployment gap, ut−u∗t , interpretable
as a Phillips curve relation. The policy target is therefore no longer explicit as a long-term
relationship, but the main conclusions from the analysis of r = 1 are preserved:
The Federal funds rate, ft, significantly equilibrium corrects to both long-run relations,
and based on the weights of the two relations in the dynamic equation for ∆ft, the implicit
policy target has a coeﬃcient to the unemployment gap of around 2.0. Under this structure
there is a small negative coeﬃcient to the actual inflation in the policy reaction function,
as it was also found in the unrestricted structure for the case r = 1. The bond rate and the
unemployment gap are still weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters, while inflation,
πt, equilibrium corrects to both relations.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we reconsider the empirical relationships between the Federal funds rate,
unemployment, inflation, and the long-term government-bond rate by means of cointe-
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gration techniques. As a starting point, we reinterpret the simple Taylor-type policy rule
as a longer term target for the policy instrument, which makes the actual policy reaction
function a dynamic adjustment towards the target. Being formulated in terms of observ-
ables, the policy target inherits any volatility of the observed data and it is natural that
interest rate smoothing should be an integral part of the description of monetary policy.
As the target for the Federal funds rate we find a simple, yet stable, relationship
comprising the bond rate and the deviation of the unemployment rate from an estimated
natural rate. The estimated relation is interpretable as a monetary policy target because
the Federal funds rate seems to be the main variable correcting deviations from the equilib-
rium relationship. The presence of the bond rate is interpreted as indicating an important
role of financial market information, most notable the information on expected inflation
contained in bond yields. The result also fits into recent work on central banking as man-
aging expectations as a supplement to setting short-term interest rates. The objectives of
monetary policy and the FOMC’s assessment of the stance of the economy are clarified in
statements and testimonies, and the financial market may react before policy changes are
actually implemented in the Federal funds rate. Within the estimated system inflation is
controllable with the Federal funds rate, but since the registered unemployment rate is
uncontrollable, the main transmission is not via the labour marked. The implications of
this finding are left for future research.
The real-time monetary policy process is—without doubt—far more complicated than
indicated by the estimation results obtained for the current information set. We believe,
however, that the present study gives a theoretically understandable and empirically rel-
evant characterization of the monetary policy process in terms of observable variables.
Moreover, the interpretation of interest rate smoothing as equilibrium correction ensures
that the variables in the estimated target are actually driving variables for the Federal
funds rate in the empirical model, and not just covariates in a claimed structural policy
relation. A traditional Taylor-rule, where the Federal funds rate reacts to inflation and
the unemployment gap, is clearly rejected.
Naturally, it would be interesting to reconsider the results for the policy process based
on richer information set; and it would also be of interest to consider other time periods
and countries. These extensions are, however, far beyond the scope of the present paper.
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